Opinion: National security and defence policy documents position New Zealand in relation to a threatening world

This morning at Parliament, the Honorable Andrew Little has released three critical policy documents focusing on the security of Aotearoa New Zealand. Minister Little was supported by the Chief of Defence Force, Air Vice Marshall Kevin Short, the Chief Executive of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet Ms Rebecca Kitteridge and the Secretary of Defence Mr Andrew Bridgeman.

This is a serious business fronted by our most senior Defence and security governmental officials. Together this release of papers and unified front represents a combined security focus from Government that has not been seen in living memory.

These papers are:

1) The National Security Strategy

2) The Defence Policy and Strategy Statement

3) The Future Force design principles for the New Zealand Defence Force.

Combined, these documents indicate that New Zealand is positioning itself in relation to what is labelled ‘an increased disrupted and contested world.’

What does this mean? That the Ukraine Invasion, power competition between China and the United States, climate change and our vulnerability to misinformation, terrorism and cyberattacks are changing New Zealand’s threat environment from benign to threatening.

The new National Security Strategy is the first document of this kind to be released in New Zealand. Previously we have been rather ad-hoc about security, leaving it to various ministries and agencies to look after their various domains.

The National Security Strategy is focused on protecting New Zealanders from ‘those who would do us harm.’ Policy language is carefully constructed and this language clearly indicates active and malicious threats to New Zealand.

The strategy is intended as an overarching document for the security work of the entire sector. It identifies 12 core national security issues which include:

1. Strategic Competition and the Rules-based International System
2. Emerging, critical and sensitive technologies
3. Disinformation
4. Foreign interference and espionage
5. Terrorism and violent extremism
6. Transnational organised crime
7. Economic security
8. Pacific resilience and security
9. Maritime security
10. Border security
11. Cyber security
12. Space security

All 12 core issues are translated into Māori and the strategy notes that everyone in New Zealand is welcomed to gather under our korowai manaaki of national security. The attempt at a Tiriti-led approach to the strategy is a first and a welcome presentation of who we are as people living in New Zealand.

I can also personally attest to the length of time that has been taken to develop these documents and that policy makers have consulted widely across the public and academia, including with Massey’s defence and security students.

In terms of the Defence Policy and Strategy document, there is a clear picture of a world where war has returned and that the international rules-based order has been disregarded by Russia in its illegal invasion of Ukraine. That Russia seems intent on continuing that war is opening broader possibilities of conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO is certainly rearming.

Likewise, the increasing military capability of China seems aimed at exerting power in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and is increasingly aimed at the invasion of Taiwan in the next few years. For China to do that effectively it must reduce the United States and its allies’ ability to respond.

Our defence policy is focused on the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) being increasingly combat capable, interoperable with our military ally Australia and playing an increasingly supportive role in the Pacific.

There are challenges of course. The NZDF has lost so many staff because of the Managed Isolation and Quarantine (MIQ) deployments and a tight labour market. As we saw in Cyclone Gabriel, it can’t deploy all its current capabilities at full effect.

Military hardware is extremely expensive and in a political environment where our health and education sectors are struggling and the cost of living is increasing, funding a Defence Force may be seen as a luxury for some.

What is clear is that New Zealand’s modest military capacity is stretched (which is a threat in itself) and it is now for the first time in a long time possibly needed to prepare for securing our borders, maritime domain and protecting the Pacific in a more assertive manner.

For those of us who study the domain of New Zealand security, this is probably the most important day since the abject horror of the Christchurch terror attack on 15 March 2019, which fundamentally changed the way the nation thought about its domestic security.

It might just be that 4 August 2023 marks a critical change in the way we think about the future of New Zealand’s national and international security.

Associate Professor William Hoverd is the Director of Massey's Centre for Defence and Security Studies.